Artificial Intelligence Industry In China

The synthetic intelligence market in individuals’s Republic of China is a rapidly developing multi-billion dollar industry. The roots of China’s AI development started in the late 1970s following Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms emphasizing science and innovation as the country’s main efficient force.

The preliminary stages of China’s AI development were sluggish and came across significant obstacles due to lack of resources and skill. At the beginning China lagged many Western countries in terms of AI development. A bulk of the research study was led by scientists who had gotten greater education abroad. [1]

Since 2006, the federal government of individuals’s Republic of China has actually gradually established a national program for expert system development and became among the leading countries in expert system research study and development. [2] In 2016, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released its thirteenth five-year strategy in which it intended to end up being a global AI leader by 2030. [3]

The State Council has a list of « nationwide AI groups » including fifteen China-based companies, consisting of Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba, SenseTime, and iFlytek. [citation needed] Each company needs to lead the development of a designated specialized AI sector in China, such as facial recognition, software/hardware, and speech acknowledgment. China’s fast AI development has actually considerably affected Chinese society in numerous areas, including the socio-economic, military, and political spheres. Agriculture, transportation, lodging and food services, and manufacturing are the leading industries that would be the most impacted by further AI release.

The private sector, university labs, and the armed force are working collaboratively in numerous elements as there are couple of current existing borders. [4] In 2021, China released the Data Security Law of individuals’s Republic of China, its first nationwide law addressing AI-related ethical concerns. In October 2022, the United States federal government announced a series of export controls and trade constraints meant to restrict China’s access to sophisticated computer system chips for AI applications. [5] [6]

Concerns have been raised about the results of the Chinese federal government’s censorship regime on the development of generative synthetic intelligence and skill acquisition with state of the country’s demographics. [7] [8]

History

The research study and development of synthetic intelligence in China started in the 1980s, with the announcement by Deng Xiaoping of the significance of science and technology for China’s economic growth. [3]

Late 1970s to early 2010s

Artificial intelligence research study and development did not begin until the late 1970s after Deng Xiaoping’s financial reforms. [3] While there was a lack of AI-related research study in between the 1950s and 1960s, some scholars think this is because of the impact of cybernetics from the Soviet Union despite the Sino-Soviet split throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. [9] In the 1980s, a group of Chinese scientists released AI research led by Qian Xuesen and Wu Wenjun. [9] However, throughout the time, China’s society still had an usually conservative view towards AI. [9] Early AI development in China was challenging so China’s government approached these difficulties by sending Chinese scholars overseas to study AI and additional supplying government funds for research study tasks. The Chinese Association for Expert System (CAAI) was founded in September 1981 and was licensed by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. [10] The very first chairman of the executive committee was Qin Yuanxun, who received a PhD in viewpoint from Harvard University. [citation needed] In 1987, China’s very first research publication on synthetic intelligence was published by Tsinghua University. Beginning in 1993, wise automation and intelligence have been part of China’s nationwide innovation plan. [9]

Since the 2000s, the Chinese federal government has actually further broadened its research and advancement funds for AI and the variety of government-sponsored research study jobs has considerably increased. [3] In 2006, China revealed a policy concern for the advancement of expert system, which was included in the National Medium and Long Term Plan for the of Science and Technology (2006-2020), released by the State Council. [2] In the same year, expert system was also mentioned in the l lth five-year strategy. [11]

In 2011, the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) developed a branch in Beijing, China. [12] At exact same year, the Wu Wenjun Expert System Science and Technology Award was founded in honor of Chinese mathematician Wu Wenjun, and it ended up being the highest award for Chinese accomplishments in the field of artificial intelligence. The first award ceremony was held on May 14, 2012. [13] In 2013, the International Joint Conferences on Expert System (IJCAI) was held in Beijing, marking the very first time the conference was kept in China. This occasion accompanied the Chinese government’s statement of the « Chinese Intelligence Year, » a substantial turning point in China’s advancement of expert system. [12]

Late 2010s to early 2020s

The State Council of China released « A Next Generation Expert System Development Plan » (State Council Document [2017] No. 35) on 20 July 2017. In the file, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council prompted governing bodies in China to promote the development of expert system. Specifically, the plan explained AI as a strategic technology that has actually become a « focus of global competition ». [14]:2 The document advised substantial financial investment in a variety of tactical areas connected to AI and called for close cooperation in between the state and personal sectors. On the celebration of CCP general secretary Xi Jinping’s speech at the first plenary meeting of the Central Military-Civil Fusion Development Committee (CMCFDC), scholars from the National Defense University composed in the PLA Daily that the « transferability of social resources » between economic and military ends is an important component to being a great power. [15] During the Two Sessions 2017, »expert system plus » was proposed to be elevated to a strategic level. [16] The very same year experienced the introduction of multiple application-level usages in the medical field according to reports. [17] Furthermore, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) developed their AI processor chip research study lab in Nanjing, and introduced their very first AI expertise chip, Cambrian. [citation needed]

In 2018, Xinhua News Agency, in partnership with Tencent’s subsidiary Sogou, released its very first synthetic intelligence-generated news anchor. [18] [19] [20]

In 2018, the State Council budgeted $2.1 billion for an AI industrial park in Mentougou district. [21] In order to achieve this the State Council specified the requirement for enormous talent acquisition, theoretical and practical advancements, as well as public and personal investments. [14] A few of the stated motivations that the State Council gave for pursuing its AI method include the capacity of synthetic intelligence for industrial improvement, much better social governance and maintaining social stability. [14] Since the end of 2020, Shanghai’s Pudong District had 600 AI companies across fundamental, technical, and application layers, with related industries valued at around 91 billion yuan. [22]

In 2019, the application of synthetic intelligence broadened to various fields such as quantum physics, geography, and medical research. With the emergence of large language models (LLMs), at the start of 2020, Chinese researchers started developing their own LLMs. One such example is the multimodal large design called ‘Zidongtaichu.’ [23]

The Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence released China’s first big scale pre-trained language design in 2022. [24] [25]:283

In November 2022, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the Ministry of Public Security jointly released the policies concerning deepfakes, which ended up being effective in January 2023. [26]

In July 2023, Huawei released its variation 3.0 of its Pangu LLM. [27]

In July 2023, China launched its Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative Expert System Services. [28]:96 A draft proposal on fundamental generative AI services safety requirements, consisting of requirements for data collection and model training was issued in October 2023. [28]:96

Also in October 2023, the Chinese federal government released its Global AI Governance Initiative, which frames its AI policy as part of a Neighborhood of Common Destiny and intends to build AI policy discussion with developing countries. [29] [28]:93 The Initiative has actually expressed issue over AI security threats, including abuse of information or using AI by terrorists. [28]:93

In 2024, Spamouflage, an online disinformation and propaganda project of the Ministry of Public Security, started utilizing news anchors created with generative expert system to deliver phony news clips. [18]

In March 2024, Premier Li Qiang introduced the AI+ Initiative, which means to incorporate AI into China’s genuine economy. [28]:95

In May 2024, the Cyberspace Administration of China revealed that it rolled out a large language design trained on Xi Jinping Thought. [30]

According to the 2024 report from the International Data Corporation (IDC), Baidu AI Cloud holds China’s largest LLM market share with 19.9 percent and US$ 49 million in revenue over the in 2015. This was followed by SenseTime, with 16 percent market share, and by Zhipu AI, as the 3rd biggest. The fourth and 5th biggest were Baichuan and the Hong-Kong noted AI business 4Paradigm respectively. [31] Baichuan, Zhipu AI, Moonshot AI and MiniMax were praised by investors as China’s new « AI Tigers ». [32] In April 2024, 117 generative AI designs had actually been authorized by the Chinese federal government. [33]

As of 2024, numerous Chinese innovation companies such as Zhipu AI and Bytedance have actually released AI video-generation tools to rival OpenAI’s Sora. [34]

Chronology of major AI-related policies

Ministry of Science and Technology; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs

National Development and Reform Commission; Ministry of Science and Technology Ministry of Industry and Information Technology

Government goals

According to a February 2019 publication by the Center for a New American Security, CCP basic secretary Xi Jinping – thinks that being at the leading edge of AI technology will be vital to the future of global military and economic power competition. [35] By 2025, the State Council goes for China to make fundamental contributions to basic AI theory and to solidify its place as a worldwide leader in AI research. Further, the State Council goes for AI to become « the primary driving force for China’s commercial updating and financial change » by this time. [14] By 2030, the State Council intends to have China be the international leader in the development of artificial intelligence theory and technology. The State Council declares that China will have established a « mature new-generation AI theory and innovation system. » [14]

According to academics Karen M. Sutter and Zachary Arnold, the Chinese government « seeks to blend state planning and control while some operational versatility for companies. In this context, China’s AI firms are hybrid players. The state guides their activity, funds, and shields them from foreign competitors through domestic market defenses, producing asymmetric advantages as they broaden offshore. » [36]

The CCP’s fourteenth five-year strategy reaffirmed AI as a leading research study top priority and ranks AI initially among « frontier industries » that the Chinese government intends to concentrate on through 2035. [3] The AI market is a strategic sector typically supported by China’s government guidance funds. [37]:167

Research and development

Chinese public AI funding mainly concentrated on sophisticated and applied research. [38] The federal government financing also supported multiple AI R&D in the private sector through endeavor capitals that are backed by the state. [38] Much analytic firm research showed that, while China is massively investing in all elements of AI development, facial acknowledgment, biotechnology, quantum computing, medical intelligence, and autonomous lorries are AI sectors with the most attention and financing. [39]

According to nationwide assistance on developing China’s state-of-the-art commercial development zones by the Ministry of Science and Technology, there are fourteen cities and one county chosen as a speculative advancement zone. [40] Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces have the most AI innovation in speculative areas. However, the focus of AI R&D differed depending upon cities and regional industrial advancement and ecosystem. For circumstances, Suzhou, a city with a longstanding strong manufacturing industry, heavily focuses on automation and AI facilities while Wuhan focuses more on AI implementations and the education sector. [40] In connection with universities, tech companies, and nationwide ministries, Shenzhen and Hangzhou each co-founded generative AI labs. [25]:282

In 2016 and 2017, Chinese groups won the top prize at the Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge, a worldwide competition for computer vision systems. [41] Much of these systems are now being integrated into China’s domestic surveillance network. [42]

Interdisciplinary partnerships play a necessary function in China’s AI R&D, including academic-corporate partnership, public-private collaborations, and international partnerships and tasks with corporate-government collaborations are the most common. [1] China ranked in the leading 3 worldwide following the United States and the European Union for the overall number of peer-reviewed AI publications that are produced under a corporate-academic collaboration between 2015 and 2019. [43] Besides, according to an AI index report, China exceeded the U.S. in 2020 in the overall variety of worldwide AI-related journal citations. [43] In regards to AI-related R&D, China-based peer-reviewed AI documents are generally sponsored by the government. In May 2021, China’s Beijing Academy of Expert system launched the world’s largest pre-trained language design (WuDao). [44]

Since 2023, 47% of the world’s leading AI researchers had actually completed their undergraduate research studies in China. [28]:101

According to academic Angela Huyue Zhang, publishing in 2024, while the Chinese government has actually been proactive in controling AI services and imposing obligations on AI companies, the total method to its regulation is loose and shows a pro-growth policy favorable to China’s AI market. [28]:96 In July 2024, the government opened its first algorithm registration center in Beijing. [45]

Population

China’s big population creates an enormous amount of accessible information for companies and scientists, which uses an essential advantage in the race of big information. As of 2024 [update], China has the world’s biggest variety of web users, producing huge amounts of data for artificial intelligence and AI applications. [46]:18

Facial recognition

Facial acknowledgment is one of the most commonly used AI applications in China. Collecting these big amounts of information from its citizens assists further train and expand AI capabilities. China’s market is not just conducive and important for corporations to additional AI R&D but also uses significant financial possible attracting both global and domestic companies to sign up with the AI market. The extreme advancement of the info and communication technology (ICT) industry and AI chipsets in the last few years are two examples of this. [47] China has become the world’s biggest exporter of facial recognition technology, according to a January 2023 Wired report. [48]

Censorship and content controls

In April 2023, [49] the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) released draft steps stating that tech companies will be bound to make sure AI-generated content upholds the ideology of the CCP consisting of Core Socialist Values, prevents discrimination, respects intellectual property rights, and safeguards user information. [50] [25]:278 Under these draft measures, companies bear legal obligation for training data and content created through their platforms. [25]:278 In October 2023, the Chinese government mandated that generative artificial intelligence-produced content might not « incite subversion of state power or the toppling of the socialist system. » [51] Before releasing a big language design to the public, business need to look for approval from the CAC to accredit that the model declines to respond to particular concerns relating to political ideology and criticism of the CCP. [8] [52] Questions related to politically sensitive subjects such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations and massacre or contrasts in between Xi Jinping and Winnie the Pooh need to be decreased. [52]

In 2023, in-country access was obstructed to Hugging Face, a company that maintains libraries including training information sets typically utilized for large language models. [8] A subsidiary of individuals’s Daily, the main paper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, offers local companies with training information that CCP leaders consider allowable. [8] In 2024, individuals’s Daily released a LLM-based tool called Easy Write. [53]

Microsoft has actually cautioned that the Chinese government uses generative artificial intelligence to interfere in foreign elections by spreading disinformation and provoking conversations on divisive political concerns. [54] [55] [56]

The Chinese expert system model DeepSeek has been reported to refuse to respond to questions connecting to things about the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations and massacre, persecution of Uyghurs, contrasts in between Xi Jinping and Winnie the Pooh or human rights in China. [57] [58] [59]

Impact

Economic effect

Most companies [who?] hold optimistic views about AI’s economic effect on China’s long-term economic development. In the past, standard markets in China have actually had problem with the boost in labor costs due to the growing aging population in China and the low birth rate. With the release of AI, functional expenses are anticipated to minimize while an increase in efficiency generates revenue growth. [60] Some highlight the value of a clear policy and governmental support in order to overcome adoption barriers consisting of costs and lack of correctly trained technical skills and AI awareness. [61] However, there are concerns about China’s deepening earnings inequality and the ever-expanding imbalanced labor market in China. Low- and medium-income employees might be the most negatively affected by China’s AI advancement since of increasing demands for workers with innovative skills. [61] Furthermore, China’s financial development may be disproportionately divided as a majority of AI-related industrial development is focused in seaside regions instead of inland. [61]

An influential decision by the Beijing Internet Court has ruled that AI-generated content is entitled to copyright security. [28]:98

Military effect

China looks for to build a « world-class » military by « intelligentization » with a specific concentrate on making use of unmanned weapons and artificial intelligence. [62] [63] It is looking into numerous kinds of air, land, sea, and undersea autonomous cars. In the spring of 2017, a civilian Chinese university with ties to the military demonstrated an AI-enabled swarm of 1,000 unoccupied aerial cars at an airshow. A media report launched later on revealed a computer system simulation of a similar swarm formation finding and ruining a rocket launcher. [4]:23 Open-source publications showed that China is likewise establishing a suite of AI tools for cyber operations. [64] [4]:27 Chinese development of military AI is largely influenced by China’s observation of U.S. strategies for defense development and worries of a broadening « generational gap » in comparison to the U.S. military. Similar to U.S. military concepts, China intends to use AI for exploiting large troves of intelligence, creating a typical operating photo, and accelerating battlefield decision-making. [64] [4]:12 -14 The Chinese Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW) is considered China’s response to the U.S. Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) strategy, which seeks to integrate sensing units and weapons with AI and a vigorous network. [65] [66]

Twelve classifications of military applications of AI have been recognized: UAVs, USVs, UUVs, UGVs, smart munitions, intelligent satellites, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) software application, automated cyber defense software application, automated cyberattack software, choice support, software application, automated rocket launch software application, and cognitive electronic warfare software. [67]

China’s management of its AI ecosystem contrasts with that of the United States. [4]:6 In basic, couple of borders exist in between Chinese industrial business, university research study labs, the military, and the central federal government. As a result, the Chinese government has a direct methods of guiding AI development concerns and accessing technology that was ostensibly established for civilian functions. To further enhance these ties the Chinese federal government developed a Military-Civil Fusion Development Commission which is meant to speed the transfer of AI innovation from business companies and research institutions to the military in January 2017. [2] [4]:19 In addition, the Chinese government is leveraging both lower barriers to information collection and lower costs of data labeling to produce the large databases on which AI systems train. [68] According to one estimate, China is on track to have 20% of the world’s share of data by 2020, with the potential to have more than 30% by 2030. [64] [4]:12

China’s centrally directed effort is investing in the U.S. AI market, in business dealing with militarily appropriate AI applications, potentially approving it legal access to U.S. technology and intellectual residential or commercial property. [69] Chinese equity capital investment in U.S. AI companies in between 2010 and 2017 totaled an approximated $1.3 billion. [70] [64] In September 2022, the U.S. Biden administration released an executive order to prevent foreign financial investments, « particularly those from rival or adversarial countries, » from purchasing U.S. innovation companies, due to U.S. nationwide security concerns. [71] [72] The order covers fields of U.S. innovations in which Chinese federal government has been investing, consisting of « microelectronics, synthetic intelligence, biotechnology and biomanufacturing, quantum computing, [and] advanced tidy energy. » [71] [72]

In 2024, researchers from individuals’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Sciences were reported to have actually developed a military tool using Llama, which Meta Platforms stated was unapproved due to its model usage restriction for military functions. [73] [74]

Academia

Although in 2004, Peking University presented the first academic course on AI which led other Chinese universities to adopt AI as a discipline, especially considering that China deals with challenges in recruiting and maintaining AI engineers and scientists. [21] Over half of the information researchers in the United States have been operating in the field for over ten years, while approximately the very same percentage of data scientists in China have less than 5 years of experience. As of 2017, fewer than 30 Chinese Universities produce AI-focused specialists and research items. [61]:8 Although China went beyond the United States in the variety of research study documents produced from 2011 to 2015, the quality of its published papers, as evaluated by peer citations, ranked 34th worldwide. [75] China especially desire to resolve military applications and so the Beijing Institute of Technology, among China’s premier institutes for weapons research, just recently developed the very first kids’s educational program in military AI in the world. [76]

In 2019, 34% of Chinese students studying in the AI field remained in China for work. [77] According to a database kept by an American thinktank, the percentage increased to 58% in 2022. [77]

Ethical issues

For the past years, there are conversations about AI safety and ethical concerns in both private and public sectors. In 2021, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology published the first nationwide ethical guideline, ‘the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Ethics Code’ on the subject of AI with specific emphasis on user defense, data personal privacy, and security. [78] This file acknowledges the power of AI and fast technology adaptation by the big corporations for user engagements. The South China Morning Post reported that human beings will remain completely decision-making power and rights to opt-in/-out. [78] Before this, the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence released the Beijing AI principles calling for necessary requirements in long-term research study and preparation of AI ethical principles. [79]

Data security has actually been the most typical subject in AI ethical discussion worldwide, and many national federal governments have actually developed legislation dealing with data personal privacy and security. The Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China was enacted in 2017 aiming to attend to new difficulties raised by AI advancement. [80] [original research study?] In 2021, China’s brand-new Data Security Law (DSL) was gone by the PRC congress, establishing a regulatory structure classifying all type of information collection and storage in China. [81] This suggests all tech business in China are needed to categorize their information into classifications noted in Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and follow specific standards on how to govern and handle information transfers to other celebrations. [81]

Judicial system

In 2019, the city of Hangzhou established a pilot program artificial intelligence-based Internet Court to adjudicate conflicts related to ecommerce and internet-related intellectual residential or commercial property claims. [82]:124 Parties appear before the court via videoconference and AI evaluates the evidence provided and applies appropriate legal standards. [82]:124

Because some questionable cases that drew public criticism for their low penalties have actually been withdrawn from China Judgments Online, there are issues about whether AI based on fragmented judicial information can reach unbiased choices. [83] Zhang Linghan, professor of law at the China University of Government and Law, composes that AI-technology companies may wear down judicial power. [84] Some scholars argued that « increasing party management, political oversight, and decreasing the discretionary area of judges are deliberate goals of SCR [smart court reform] » [85]

Leading companies

Leading AI-centric business and start-ups include Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba, SenseTime, 4Paradigm and Yitu Technology. [86] Chinese AI business iFlytek, SenseTime, Cloudwalk and DJI have actually received attention for facial recognition, sound recognition and drone technologies. [87]

China’s federal government takes a market-oriented technique to AI, and has sought to motivate personal tech business in establishing AI. [25]:281 In 2018, it designated Baidu, Alibaba, iFlytek, Tencent, and SenseTime as « AI champions ». [25]:281

In 2023, Tencent debuted its big language design Hunyuan for enterprise use on Tencent Cloud. [88]

New leading AI start-ups include Baichuan, Zhipu AI, Moonshot AI and MiniMax which were praised by investors as China’s new « AI Tigers » in 2024. [32] 01. AI has actually likewise been promoted as a leading startup. [89]

Assessment

Academic Jinghan Zeng argued the Chinese government’s dedication to international AI management and technological competitors was driven by its previous underperformance in innovation which was seen by the CCP as a part of the century of humiliation. [90] According to Zeng, there are traditionally ingrained causes of China’s stress and anxiety towards securing an international technological supremacy – China missed out on both industrial revolutions, the one beginning in Britain in the mid-18th century, and the one that came from in America in the late-19th century. [90] Therefore, China’s federal government desires to make the most of the technological transformation in today’s world led by digital innovation consisting of AI to resume China’s « rightful » place and to pursue the nationwide rejuvenation proposed by Xi Jinping. [90]

A post released by the Center for a New American Security concluded that « Chinese federal government officials demonstrated remarkably keen understanding of the problems surrounding AI and worldwide security. This consists of knowledge of the U.S. AI policy conversations, » and recommended that « the U.S. policymaking community to likewise focus on cultivating proficiency and understanding of AI developments in China » and « funding, focus, and a desire among U.S. policymakers to drive large-scale required modification. » [35] An article in the MIT Technology Review similarly concluded: « China might have unrivaled resources and massive untapped potential, but the West has world-leading knowledge and a strong research culture. Instead of fret about China’s development, it would be wise for Western nations to concentrate on their existing strengths, investing greatly in research study and education.  » [91]

The Chinese government’s censorship regime has actually stunted the advancement of generative expert system [7] [8]

In a 2021 text, the Research Centre for a Holistic Approach to National Security at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations composed that the development of AI produces obstacles for holistic nationwide security, consisting of the risks that AI will heighten social stress or have destabilizing impacts on global relations. [28]:49

Writing from a Chinese Marxist view, academics including Gao Qiqi and Pan Enrong compete that capitalist application of AI will result in higher injustice of employees and more major social issues. [28]:90 Gao points out how the development of AI has actually increased the power of platform companies like Meta, Twitter, and Alphabet, resulting in greater capital accumulation and political power in less economic stars. [28]:90 According to Gao, the state should be the primary responsible star in the location of generative AI (developing brand-new material like music or video). [28]:92 Gao writes that military usage of AI threats escalating military competitors in between nations and that the impact of AI in military matters will not be limited to one nation but will have spillover results. [28]:91

Dialogues in between Chinese and Western AI specialists about the existential threat from synthetic intelligence have actually taken place. [92]

Public ballot

The Chinese public is normally optimistic relating to AI. [25]:283 [28]:101 A 2021 research study carried out throughout 28 countries found that 78% of the Chinese public believes the benefits of AI surpass the risks, the greatest of any nation in the study. [25]:283 In 2024, a study of elite Chinese college student discovered that 80% concurred or highly concurred that AI will do more good than harm for society, and 31% believed it ought to be regulated by the government. [93]

Human rights

The commonly used AI facial acknowledgment has actually raised concerns. [94] According to The New York City Times, release of AI facial recognition innovation in the Xinjiang area to find Uyghurs is « the first known example of a federal government purposefully utilizing synthetic intelligence for racial profiling, » [95] which is stated to be « one of the most striking examples of digital authoritarianism. » [96] Researchers have found that in China, areas experiencing greater rates of unrest are related to increased state acquisition of AI facial recognition innovation, particularly by local municipal cops departments. [97] [98]

Artificial intelligence.
Artificial intelligence arms race
China Brain Project
Fifth generation computer
List of artificial intelligence business
Regulation of expert system

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Further reading

Hannas, William C.; Chang, Huey-Meei, eds. (29 July 2022). Chinese Power and Expert System: Perspectives and Challenges (1st ed.). London: Routledge.